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Abstract
After more than two decades of trade liberalization, faced with deep structural prob-
lems which were exacerbated by the 2008 financial crisis and culminated in the 
2011 Spring Revolution and government change, in 2016 Egypt started to protect 
some sectors from foreign competition. This paper assesses how tariff reforms dur-
ing the 1998–2018 period affected the Egyptian labour market by focusing on real 
wages and job stability (i.e. having a permanent position). The empirical analysis is 
carried out on worker-level data from the available four waves of Egyptian Labour 
Market Panel Survey (ELMPS), including the recently released 2018 wave. We find 
that higher tariff protection tends to worsen labour market conditions, both lower-
ing real wages and decreasing the probability of finding a stable job. Furthermore, 
tariff changes show remarkable asymmetries. There is a negative and significant cor-
relation between tariffs increases and real wages, while the positive impact of tariff 
reductions turns out to be negligible and insignificant. Our findings support the view 
that in Egypt protectionism hampered working conditions, contributing to inequal-
ity, while liberalizations did not improve nor deteriorate them.
Keywords Trade policy · Labour market · Wage · Inequality · Egypt
JEL classification F13 · F14 · F16
1 Introduction
The process of trade liberalization and market-oriented reforms that started in the 
early 1980s and intensified in the 1990s triggered developing countries’ integration 
in the global market. Their exports reached almost half of total world exports (44% 
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of merchandise trade in 2019 and 34% of commercial service trade, WTO 2019) and 
their rapid economic growth, the so-called Great Convergence (Baldwin 2016), has 
often been attributed to the increase in trade openness.
The existing literature has inquired about the links between trade liberalization, 
growth and inequality. Earlier papers (see for all Dollar 1992; Edwards 1998) sup-
ported the idea that openness to trade was associated with better economic out-
comes. Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000), on the other hand, claimed that “the rela-
tionship between trade policy and economic growth remains very much an open 
question” and “is far from having been settled on empirical grounds.” More recently 
the view that trade reforms generate substantial improvements in developing coun-
tries has again found empirical support (for a recent review, see Pavcnik 2017; Irwin 
2019).
However, if globalization and international trade, accompanied by technological 
change, contributed to aggregate growth at the world level and reduced inequality 
between countries, their increased importance coincided with a raise in inequal-
ity within countries. These asymmetric effects of trade, already present in clas-
sical trade theory, have been emphasized in the “new new trade theory” models, 
where trade is associated with simultaneous destruction and creation of jobs, with 
changes in the wage distribution and in returns to skills (see for instance Helpman 
et al. 2010a). The mechanisms at work are different, for instance: changes in tech-
nology (such as the increasing use of computers), increase in the demand for skilled 
workers (and their wages) and trade-induced pro-competitive pressures in the market 
(that might help to avoid distortions). Due to increased inequality within-countries 
and other factors, including the economic and financial crises of 2008–2012, the lib-
eralization process of the last decades seems now come to an end, with protectionist 
forces on the rise (WTO 2020).1
Egypt is no exception to this common trend: earlier liberalization was followed by 
a recent return to protectionism. In the last decades, structural reforms were imple-
mented to modernize the country also in response to internal and external shocks. 
In the late 1970s, Egypt was the first among the Middle Eastern and North African 
(MENA) countries to adopt a trade liberalization policy.2 In the aftermath of the 
1 Public consensus towards more protective measures gradually increased in many countries after the 
2008 financial crisis. The recent US-China trade war comes after a long debate, even among scholars, on 
the possible crowding-out of US workers due to Chinese imports (Autor et al. 2013). Despite the general 
view among economists, supported by facts, is that protectionist measures are costly even to the impos-
ing countries (Amiti et al. 2019; Fajgelbaum et al. 2020) in the last months the Covid-19 outbreak gave 
new voice in support of trade restrictions such as export bans (see, for instance, the Financial Times arti-
cle “Covid-19 is bringing out protectionist instincts”, April 19th 2020 (available at https ://www.ft.com/
conte nt/ed78b 09c-80a3-11ea-8fdb-7ec06 edeef 84). See also the https ://macma p.org/covid 19 to have a 
clear picture of the restrictive measures recently implemented.
2 In the choice among the several available indicators for trade liberalization, we refer to Goldberg and 
Pavcnik (2004). Indeed, the authors argue that the use of tariffs provides advantages over other measures, 
such as degree of openness of the economy, as they can be comparable across time and vary substantially 
across industries during trade reforms. However, there may be concerns, since tariffs depend strongly on 




1986 oil countershock, in the middle of a very severe economic crisis, the govern-
ment implemented the economic reform and structural adjustment programs (SAP) 
and the structural adjustment loan (SAL) sponsored by the international financial 
institutions. These agreements recommended a strong orientation towards trade lib-
eralization. For most of the 1980s and the 1990s, Egyptian tariffs, with few excep-
tions, were reduced. However, the dismantling of import-substitution policies in 
favour of the Structural Adjustment Program did not produce the expected economic 
results: while enhancing aggregate economic growth, these policies failed to include 
the different segments of the Egyptian labour market.3
In what follows, we focus on the labour market effects of trade policy reforms: 
the Egyptian trade liberalization provides an excellent setting in which to study 
these effects.
For several years, Egypt’s labour market was not able to absorb the abundant 
labour supply of educated (skilled) young adults. As a result, inequality increased 
(World Bank 2007).4 During the early 2000s, labour market indicators started to 
slightly improve, but the 2008 financial crisis and the 2011 Spring Revolutions took 
the country back to a situation of economic slowdown. In the attempt to stabilize 
the economy and reduce the political turmoil, starting from 2016, the Egyptian 
government implemented new structural reforms but this time opted for a return to 
protectionism. Overall, despite having been the first among the MENA countries to 
embrace trade liberalization policies, and member of the WTO since its start, Egypt 
remains one of the most protected countries in the region, with import tariffs well 
above the average. Moreover, Egyptian firms appear to be less integrated in the 
international market, with a lower percentage of exporting firms and more inefficien-
cies in clearing customs procedures. According to the Enabling Trade Index issued 
by the World Economic Forum, over time Egypt worsened from being the 87th (in 
2008) to 116th (in 2016) amongst 136 countries for the ease of getting goods across 
the border, a serious deterioration.
Against this background, an evaluation of the success and the effects of first pro-
market reforms and then protection is of primary interest.
We focus on tariff reforms during the last two decades and study their effects on 
the Egyptian labour market. Our main research questions are: how/to what extent 
did the tariff reforms affect wages and job stability of Egyptian workers? Did tar-
iff increases have the same (opposite) impact as tariff liberalizations or is there an 
asymmetric effect? Did tariff reforms affect workers’ inequality by skill and gender?
Exploiting the available four waves of the Egypt Labour Market Panel Survey 
(ELMPS), we contribute to the debate with a 20-year view of Egyptian labour mar-
ket dynamics. Our data include the early liberalization phases as well as the recent 
return to protectionist measures (in the recently released 2018 wave). The four 
waves of the ELMPS-1998, 2006, 2012 and 2018—offer a unique opportunity to 
investigate the long-term effects of the trade liberalization process on labour market 
outcomes as well as to explore the heterogeneity across different segments of the 
3 See for instance Alissa (2007).
4 See also the World Inequality Database (available at https ://wid.world /count ry/egypt /).
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labour market. Moreover, thanks to the recent switch to protectionism, we are also 
able to test the potential existence of asymmetric effects of tariff increases versus 
tariff reductions.
Our results bring new evidence on the heterogeneous individual-level effects 
of two decades of tariff reforms in Egypt. We find that higher protection tends to 
worsen labour market conditions, both lowering real wages and decreasing the 
probability of finding a stable job (i.e. having a permanent formal contract). These 
results do not seem driven by aggregate trends and hold under several specifications, 
including panel and instrumental variables estimations. Furthermore, tariff changes 
show remarkable asymmetries. The negative and significant correlation between 
tariff increases and real wages does not hold for liberalizations: their impact turns 
out small or insignificant. A similar asymmetry applies to job stability: only tariff 
increases tend to have an effect, reducing job stability. Overall, our findings support 
the view that in Egypt protectionism hampered working conditions and inequality, 
while liberalizations did not improve nor deteriorate them.5
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature. Sec-
tion 3 describes Egypt’s tariff reforms and the Egyptian labour market for the period 
2008–2018. Section 4 discusses data and methodology. Section 5 reports our empir-
ical findings. Section 6 concludes.
2  The effects of trade liberalizations on wages: a review 
of the literature
This paper connects to a broad literature studying the effect of trade liberalization on 
labour market outcomes.6 Until the 1990s, the model generally used to single out the 
possible link between trade and inequality was the Heckscher–Ohlin (H–O) model. 
Its most relevant prediction for the labour market comes from the Stolper–Samuel-
son theorem (S–S hereafter) stating that trade increases the real return to the fac-
tor that is relatively abundant and lowers the real return to the scarce factor. For 
a (low-skill) labour abundant developing country like Egypt, the S–S theorem pre-
dicts a negative correlation between tariffs and wages: a trade liberalization such 
as an import tariff reduction, by increasing specialization, will raise prices in the 
export sector and reduce them in the import sector. Consequently, workers (mostly 
6 We confine the review of the literature to articles focused on wages and job stability. The amount of 
recent papers on these issues is very large and it is outside the scope of this paper to review all the pos-
sible mechanisms. See Harrison et al. (2011) for a comprehensive survey.
5 There might be, however, important sources of heterogeneity by sector. For instance, some sectors had 
specific shocks due technological change or foreign competition, as we discuss later, or may be more 
or less affected by tariff changes. In thus study, we control for unobserved sectoral characteristics with 
industry-specific f.e., but we do not perform an ad hoc sectoral analysis, which is outside the scope of 
this paper. Nonetheless, we briefly consider separately (see “Appendix”) two important sectors: Food 
and Beverages and Textile. Results points towards the possible existence of sectoral specificities in the 




unskilled) benefit from wage increases, while the remuneration of the factor used 
intensively in the import-sector declines (Baldwin 2008).
One problem with the H–O model is that it assumes perfect cross-sectoral fac-
tor mobility and therefore within-country factor price equalization. This is a limi-
tation since it implies the existence of a single wage at the country level, which is 
very unlikely to hold when labour markets present rigidities. “The Heckscher–Ohlin 
model, the Ricardian model, and their cousins all assume that workers could switch 
industries without cost so that, if two industries are producing, they must offer the 
same wage to workers with the same ability. However, we know that this is not the 
way things work in the world. We have abundant evidence that there are frictions 
caused by switching industries, by moving across locations within a country, and 
by switching occupations. These frictions all imply that whether one gains or loses 
from a trade shock may be determined by one’s industry, location, occupation, or 
similar factors.” (McLaren 2017, p. 178).
In the case of Egypt, as we shall briefly see in the next section, the labour market 
is segmented and rigid. Hence, the standard H–O model is unlikely to provide an 
accurate description. Nonetheless, the mechanisms suggested by the S–S theorem 
remain appealing to explain the underlying long-run economic forces.
Within the standard trade models, the specific-factor model, which assumes 
imperfect cross-sector factor mobility or, in the basic version, that factors are fully 
sector-specific, may provide a more realistic description of the labour market. This 
model stresses that trade, beside affecting inequality through the skill premium (the 
S–S theorem), can also affect the industry wage premia intended as the “part of 
worker wages that cannot be explained by observable worker characteristics […], 
but can be attributed to workers’ industry affiliation” (p. 42, Goldberg and Pavcnik 
2007).7 The main prediction of the model is that, if we assume labour as the immo-
bile (and therefore specific) factor, it will lose from lower tariffs in the import com-
peting firms but it will win in export-competing industries.
But, while the standard trade models provide useful insights, spurred by increased 
evidence and data availability, more recent models seem better suited to deal with 
the complexity of the real world and the faceted aspects of globalisation. Rooted on 
the Melitz’s model (2003) of the heterogenous firms and its developments, a strand 
of the theoretical literature provides new perspectives on the relation between trade 
and the labour market. In these models, trade liberalizations will push out of the 
market the least productive firms reallocating market shares towards the most effi-
cient producers, thereby increasing average productivity.8 Provided that industry-
level productivity enhancements are channelled to industry wages, these models also 
predict a negative correlation between tariffs and wages. The correlation is the same 
as in the H–O model, but the underlying mechanism is completely different.
7 See for instance Dutta (2007) for a longer description of this mechanism for a developing country (in 
this case India).
8 Martins and Opromolla (2009) find that productivity increases systematically when firms engage in 
either exporting and importing, with positive repercussions also on wages.
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Related to the “new new trade theory” approach, some papers highlight the 
effects of import competition and offshoring on wages and employment (e.g. Liu 
and Trefler 2008); some models analyse the effects of trade on inequality among 
workers doing the same job in the same industry, through heterogeneous-firms mod-
els or implicit-contracts models. Other authors assume a relationship between firm-
specific wages and firm’s response to globalization; for instance, Helpman et  al. 
(2010a) develop a new framework that incorporates firm and worker heterogene-
ity, search and matching frictions in the labour market, and screening of workers by 
firms. Their model finds that trade liberalization raises wage inequality.
In summary, the theoretical literature highlights different possible mechanisms 
to explain how changes in tariffs impact on wages and inequality. Which mecha-
nism is likely to prevail is however inherently an empirical question, whose answer 
possibly depends on the economic context of the analysis. As a matter of fact, the 
available empirical evidence and, more closely related to this paper, the findings 
from studies that analyse individual and household data from developing countries 
are mixed. Some find no significant association between liberalization and industry 
wage premia (e.g. Feliciano 2001 for Mexico). Others find a positive relationship, 
primarily driven by technological change, through trade and imported inputs, favor-
ing skilled workers (e.g. Attanasio et al. 2004, for Colombia) or driven by imperfect 
factor mobility (e.g. Kovak 2013, for Brazil). Lastly, in line with our results as well 
as with theoretical predictions from the above-mentioned models, some find that tar-
iffs are negatively associated with industry wage premia (e.g. Kumar and Mishra 
2008 for India; Murakami 2020, for Chile).9
Only a scant literature specifically focuses on Egypt. The relationship between 
tariff levels and wages is generally found to be negative, although differentiated by 
categories of workers. Said (2012) investigates the impacts of trade liberalization on 
job quality and wages in the manufacturing sector. Using both panel and quantile 
regressions for the 1998–2006 period, she finds a negative relationship between tar-
iffs and hourly wages (measured in log), with a stronger impact on the working poor, 
the focus of the analysis. At the same time, further trade liberalization deteriorates 
the jobs quality and increases the precariousness of contracts. She also finds that 
gender and the private sector workers remain the most segregated categories in the 
labour market. Based on a cross-sectional analysis of the ELMPS 2006, Zaki (2014) 
finds that non-tariff measures and red tape costs have a strong impact on wage 
inequality. Workers employed in highly protected industries receive lower wages. 
Specifically, trade liberalization increases the regional, gender and skill wage gap. 
Aboushady et  al. (2019), adopting the same methodology of Zaki (2014), analyse 
the effect of tariff, non-tariff measures and services restrictions on wage inequality 
on a cross-section of Egypt (2012), Jordan (2010) and Tunisia (2014). They find 
evidence that tariffs disproportionally and negatively affect blue-collar workers, 
whereas female workers seem to be more affected by non-tariff measures.
9 For extensive and comprehensive reviews of both the theoretical and empirical evidence on trade pol-
icy and wages, see Goldberg and Pavnick (2007) and Helpman et al. (2010b).
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Overall, the wide literature on the relation between trade and the labour mar-
ket highlights different possible mechanisms, some of them suggesting a negative 
correlation between tariffs and wages. While the empirical evidence reports mixed 
results, often country-specific, in the case of Egypt there seems to be a negative 
effect of trade liberalization on wages.
3  Egypt’s tariff reforms and the labour market
Confronted by internal structural problems and challenged by the rapid evolution 
of the international context (with China that was emerging as the dominant world 
exporter), Egypt went through several policy changes regarding its tariff structure 
and the labour market, also following the ratification of the IMF structural pro-
grammes. We single out few stylized facts.
Despite a general trend of tariff reductions, mostly in line with other MENA 
countries, Egypt’s tariffs stood above the regional and world averages, shielding the 
already relatively inward-oriented domestic firms from import competition. Further-
more, the tariff liberalization trend was not smooth: it was characterized by ups and 
downs in tariff rates and by an increasing protection in the last years. Egyptian firms 
show a relatively low degree of internationalization, with only large firms exporting 
(see “Appendix” for more detailed information).
The global trend towards liberalization is likely to have been detrimental to 
Egypt, adding up to its structural problems: wage disparity between the public and 
private sector, existence of a large informal sector, and the inability of the labour 
demand to absorb educated young workers, since the productive structure is largely 
concentrated in agricultural and traditional sectors. Over time, Egypt implemented 
several labour market reforms, with mixed effects. For instance, the minimum wage 
was significantly increased. Yet, this was perceived as a temporary fix for deeper 
structural problems since the inherent complexity and low transparency of the wage 
system was not addressed (Amer 2015). To date, despite liberalizations and reforms, 
Egypt’s remains relatively protected with a complex and segmented labour market.10
3.1  Tariff reforms
As several other low- and middle-income countries inside and outside the MENA 
region, in the 1960s and 1970s Egypt followed an import-substitution industrializa-
tion strategy. By the beginning of the 1980s, a combination of internal and external 
factors induced a reshaping of policies. The excess supply of oil stopped the inflow 
10 Moreover, over the 1998–2018 period, the Egyptian pound (EGP) went through a large depreciation 
from 3.4 to 17.8 EGP per USD. The depreciation was not smooth:2016 was marked by a strong and 
fast devaluation with the currency passing from 8.9 to 18.7 EGP per USD. The 2016 devaluation rein-
forced the tariff increases in order to discourage imports. These macro trends clearly had an impact on 
the Egyptian economy and on its workers. However, as we argue in the paper, these macroeconomic 
trends do not seem to drive our estimates.
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of foreign revenues that, in turn, lowered the ability of MENA governments to pur-
sue both import-substitution policies and interventionist-redistributive commitment. 
Meanwhile, the world economy was entering a new paradigm with the collapse of 
the Communist bloc and the poor performance of inward-oriented economies rela-
tive to the extraordinary performances of the outward-oriented economies, espe-
cially from East Asia. Eventually, also MENA countries turned to stabilization and 
adjustment programs and followed a more outward-oriented approach.
Egypt was the first Middle Eastern North African country to adopt trade liber-
alization policies, already in the late 1970s. During the 1980s, the process of indus-
trialization of the country suffered a tragic backlash. In 1986, Egypt was hit by the 
oil countershock and, facing a trade and fiscal deficit together with external debt of 
more than 150% of GDP, the country decided to address some of its structural prob-
lems with the implementation of the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment 
programs sponsored by the international financial institutions. Following the new 
pro-market approach, from the 1990s Egypt started to sign bilateral and multilat-
eral trade agreements. Within the African continent, Egypt became part of Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 1998. In the same year, it 
also joined the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), thanks to which customs 
duties on imports from the 17 Arab countries reached zero in 2005 (Elkhafif et al. 
2012). A similar trend applies to trade policies outside the African continent. Egypt 
joined the World Trade Organization from its start (1995), after having been a mem-
ber of GATT since 1970. In 1995, on November 28th, together with the then 15 EU 
Member States and 12 Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs), Egypt was one of 
the co-signatories of the Barcelona Declaration to launch the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership Process. The Barcelona Process included the implementation of bilat-
eral trade agreements and “the creation of a deep Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade 
Area, which aims at removing barriers to trade and investment between both the 
EU and Southern Mediterranean countries and between the Southern Mediterra-
nean countries themselves”.11 The association agreement with the EU was signed by 
Egypt in 2001. In 2004, with Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco, Egypt joined the Agadir 
Agreement, establishing a free trade area amongst the Arab Mediterranean coun-
tries. Meanwhile, in 1999 Egypt had signed the Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreement with the US and the Qualified Industrial Zones Agreement with US and 
Israel. In 2005, Egypt signed a free trade agreement with Turkey. In August 2010, 
Egypt signed a preferential free trade agreement with MERCOSUR. The agree-
ment entered into force after Argentina finalized its ratification process in July 2017. 
Lastly, in March 2018 Egypt signed the African Continental Free Trade Agreement 
(AfCFTA), with 44 signatories at that moment, became the largest free trade area in 
11 See https ://ec.europ a.eu/trade /polic y/count ries-and-regio ns/regio ns/euro-medit erran ean-partn ershi p/.
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terms of ratifying countries since the formation of the WTO.12 This active involve-
ment shows Egypt’s commitment towards trade liberalization.
Two different phases describe these three decades of reforms: (i) a first wave, 
which started after the adoption of Structural Adjustment Programs in the mid-80s 
and lasted until the early 90s, and (ii) a second wave—analysed in this paper and 
depicted in Fig.  1—starting at the beginning of the new century, with the estab-
lishment of a new, more free-market oriented, approach (AlAzzawi 2016). Figure 1 
shows a comparison of Egypt’s tariffs against the MENA countries and the World 
average. As mentioned above, despite liberalization, tariffs in Egypt have remained 
higher than in other MENA countries. During the period we study, two were the 
main objectives of tariff reductions. First, to rationalize the tariff structure and cut 
the tariff rates. Second, to simplify and reduce non-tariff barriers to trade (NTB). 
The number of tariff bands decreased from 27 to 6, and tariff lines went from 8000 
to 6000. After the tariff reforms, in the manufacturing sector, nominal and effective 
tariff protection decreased from 21.3 to 12.1% and from 23.3 to 14% respectively 
after the reform in 2004 (Selwaness and Zaki 2015). Moreover, Egypt also lowered 
the number of products subject to NTBs. Some key industries, however, such as the 
food sector, had a high degree of non-tariff protection, while energy subsidies con-
tinued to be granted by the state.
If before 2011 the Egyptian government was committed towards a reduction in 
the number of tariff bands and to tariff cuts, in the aftermath of the 2011 Revo-
lution, it changed direction. To face the new economic challenges, among which 
also a widening of the trade deficit, the Egyptian government raised import tariffs 
on a wide range of products, mainly non-agricultural goods (WTO 2018), includ-
ing electronic devices, clothing, shoes, household appliances and plastics. Figure 1 
shows a different reaction between Egypt and other MENA countries to the spring 
revolution: while Egypt increased tariffs, other countries did not. After a renewed 
commitment to liberalization (2013–16), in December 2016, the Egyptian govern-
ment raised import tariffs for 364 tariff lines. In the Presidential Decree, the govern-
ment described these goods as “provocative” or “unnecessary”. For most products, 
the increase was between 100 and 200%, while for the others it varied between 50, 
125, 300, 500 and 700%.13 The lift on import tariffs aimed at cutting $49 bn trade 
deficit.14
13 See the US International Trade Administration article on Egypt’s import tariffs (available at https ://
www.expor t.gov/apex/artic le2?id=Egypt -Impor t-Tariff s).
14 As reported by Reuters (at https ://www.reute rs.com/artic le/us-egypt -econo my-tariff s-idUSK BN13T 
0DN) and by the Middle East Eye (at https ://www.middl eeast eye.net/news/egypt -raise s-tariff s-impor ted-
goods -60-perce nt-69282 7788).
12 For a complete review of all the trade agreements signed by Egypt, see the Trade Policy Review of 
Egypt 2018 of the WTO (https ://www.wto.org/engli sh/trato p_e/tpr_e/tp467 _e.htm). For the AfcFTA, see 
the World Economic Forum article “Africa’s new free trade area is promising, yet full of hurdles” (avail-
able at https ://www.wefor um.org/agend a/2019/09/afric a-just-launc hed-the-world -s-large st-free-trade 
-area/) and the CNBC article “Africa is on the verge of forming the largest free trade area since the World 
Trade Organization” by Crabtree, March 20, 2018 (available at: https ://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/20/afric 
a-leade rs-to-form-large st-free-trade -area-since -the-wto.html and https ://au.int/en/cfta).
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In Table 1, we report the trends in sectoral tariffs for the period covered by our 
empirical analysis. Tariffs of almost all sectors have high correlation coefficients 
with the other sectors as well as with the aggregate trend (see the “Correlation” col-
umn of Table 1). Thus, despite some sectoral specificities especially in the level of 
protection, most sectors followed similar trends. Few sectors, nonetheless, display 
some peculiarities worth noting. The Hides and Skins sector shows a stable level in 
import tariffs (around 7%) with an extremely low but positive correlation coefficient 
with the general trend. Food Products, whose tariff dynamics move in the opposite 
direction relative to the general trend—is negatively correlated with all the other 
sectors—displays tariff rates growing from 20.9 to 100%. The textile-apparel sector 
shows a high correlation with the others over the entire period (see Table 1) and its 
dynamics are consistent with the country-wide figures; but it also displays important 
specificities due to sector-specific shocks that are worth mentioning. In 1998, the 
textile industry absorbed nearly 30% of total manufacturing and was one of the key 
sectors for the Egyptian economy (Magder 2005). But by the mid-2000s, when the 
Multi-Fibre Agreement ended and all quotas were removed, the sector, previously 
sheltered from international competition, faced severe challenges, as well as higher 
competition from East Asian economies. In the subsequent years, the share of tex-
tiles in Egypt’s merchandise exports declined from 16.6% in 1995 to 4.5% in 2003 
(WTO 2005) and employment almost halved from 22% in 2002 to 12% in 2010. 
Egypt’s trade policy for its apparel sector brought to a dispute in the international 
arena. Although Egypt agreed on removing its import ban on textile in 2002, as 
asked to do when it joined the WTO in 1995, at the same time it imposed dramati-
cally high tariff rates. It has been estimated that Egypt increased its per item tariffs 
to 100–150%, a fact that led the US Trade Representative to take Egypt to task for 
breaking its commitment. Because of this, Egypt then agreed to fulfil its commit-
ment to the WTO agreement and lowered its tariffs at the required level (Magder 
2005).
In summary, given that the first wave of liberalisation followed the indications 
of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and the second wave was 
part of a more general reform program that had the objective of improving the busi-
ness and investment climate, tariff reforms in Egypt were mostly driven by external 
forces or, at least, not generally modulated on sector-specific demands (Salem and 
Zaki 2019). The combination of co-movements of sectoral tariffs with the role of the 
multilateral negotiation to which Egypt took part over the years and with the rules 
to be followed when you are part of structural reform programmes, reduces possi-
ble concerns on the presence of sector-specific lobbying pressures or distortions and 
supports the view that tariff reforms in Egypt were largely exogenous (not imposed 
to provide differential protection, see Erten et al. (2019) for a similar argument for 
South Africa).
3.2  Wages and the labour market
Egypt is signatory of some of the most important treaties worldwide, as the Inter-
national Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Convention for 
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), and the International Labour Conven-
tion (1970), under which minimum wages are to be established and regularly updated 
within the rule of law. Moreover, Islamic law dictates that an employee should get 
his payment upon rendering the services and/or goods contracted (Abdelhamid and 
Baradei 2010). Despite the apparent ethical commitment, the Egyptian wage system 

















































Egypt, Arab Rep. Middle East & North Africa World
Fig. 1  Trend in effectively applied tariff (AHS) for Egypt, MENA region and the world (weighted aver-
age, %) (Source: WITS database)
Table 1  Egyptian tariffs, by sector, selected years and correlations with aggregate trend (Source: authors’ 
elaborations on WITS)
*Correlations between each sector and the overall trend using MFN effectively applied rate (AHS)
Average 98–18 Min Max 1998 2018 Correlation*
Animal 5.35 1.59 10.80 7.95 1.59 0.95
Chemicals 12.01 6.01 19.75 12.32 6.01 0.65
Food products 65.54 17.69 120.00 20.19 120.00 − 0.16
Footwear 32.80 24.21 46.09 38.58 45.95 0.57
Fuels 4.33 0.37 11.23 7.87 0.76 0.95
Hides and skins 24.15 13.09 43.71 29.69 42.51 0.07
Mach and elec 7.24 3.08 13.37 12.92 3.76 0.96
Metals 7.78 3.09 16.01 16.01 3.09 0.93
Minerals 2.15 0.11 9.50 9.50 0.11 0.88
Miscellaneous 9.97 5.46 14.70 13.32 7.33 0.93
Plastic or rubber 6.52 2.50 13.70 12.94 2.56 0.96
Stone and glass 7.45 2.88 18.35 18.35 8.31 0.29
Textiles and clothing 22.62 7.87 151.25 26.15 7.89 0.75
Transportation 30.39 19.05 44.07 44.07 19.51 0.71
Vegetable 2.28 0.20 6.08 6.08 0.38 0.93
Wood 6.96 2.12 13.93 11.89 2.33 0.94
 Economia Politica
1 3
2010). The striking wage difference between public and private sector, for instance, 
signals the inefficient segmentation of the labour market. Estimates from the CAP-
MAS for 2018 puts public-sector average weekly wage at LE 1278, compared to LE 
877 for the private sector. Complexity adds to the inequity of the system, making it 
opaque and easy to manipulate. The base salary upon which additions and pensions 
are calculated represents only 20% of the total wage earned by workers; the remain-
ing 80% comes from a complicate system of special bonuses and incentives (Biltagy 
2014).15
The national monthly minimum wage was set at LE 35 in 198416 and remained at 
the same level until January 25th, 2011, the day the “Egyptian revolution” started. 
More than 25 years without any modification not surprisingly led to protests, with 
many employees fighting for a minimum wage reform. As a response to mass mani-
festations, in July 2012 the minimum monthly wage for all employees was raised to 
LE 700 and, 2 years later, in 2014, to LE 1200. Moreover, in March 2019, the Presi-
dent Al-Sisi raised it again, up to LE 2000.
These minimum wage increases, far from addressing the structural problems of 
Egypt’s labour market, resulted in a high wave of discontent throughout the nation. 
Through the minimum wage hike, the Al-Sisi administration was hoping to rapidly 
enhance the economic production and reduce social unrest. But Egypt’s structural 
issues had deep roots: heavy reliance on basic goods’ import, a stagnant private sec-
tor and a too large informal sector prevented the reform to have visible effects on 
production, causing instead an increase in wage gap between the public and private 
sectors. Indeed, wage legislation has been deemed as weak because it mainly affects 
the public sector and a small fraction of the private formal sector. To give an idea, 
according to El-Haddad (2019),17 the public sector shrank by 16% between 1998 and 
2012, losing 40,000 jobs in the public administration between the 2006 and 2012 
(World Bank 2014). However, the formal private sector was able to absorb only 4% 
of workers, implying that the majority of those losing a public sector job flew to the 
informal sector,18 which of course does not adhere to the minimum wage policy (in 
fact, 75% of the workers in the informal sector earn less than the minimum wage). 
Moreover, trade union membership is also weak and collective bargaining coverage 
in the private sector is limited, leaving Egyptian employees with a low bargaining 
power. Finally, the participation of women to the working force is particularly low. 
15 Several studies found, before the 25th of January Egyptian revolution in 2011, a positive correlation 
between the presidential election year and the increase in the percentage of special bonuses that should 
be added to the basic wage.
16 As reported by the ILO (see https ://www.ilo.org/dyn/norml ex/en/f?p=NORML EXPUB :13101 
:0::NO::P1310 1_COMME NT_ID:26998 51).
17 See https ://thefo rum.erf.org.eg/2019/04/25/raisi ng-egypt s-minim um-wage-impac t-inequ ality /).
18 In this regard, the 2003 Labour Law must be mentioned. In order to loosen the existing legislation 
that was rather stringent both for employers and employees, in July 2003 the labour law No. 12 was 
passed, with the goal of increasing flexibility for employers in the private sector for hiring and firing 
their employees. Indeed, Wahba and Assad (2017) proved that the introduction of this law had a positive 
impact on the incidence of contracted jobs, thereby increasing formal employment. The share of formal 
employment however is still decreasing while that of irregular and informal employment are estimated at 
40% and 30% respectively (ILO 2018).
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According to the ILO modelled estimates, female participation rates, at 25% in 2018 
for the 15–64 age group, were the 11th lowest among 189 countries (Assaad et al. 
2019).
4  Data and methodology
4.1  Worker‑level data
We drew individual-level data from the Egypt Labour Market Panel Survey of 2018 
(ELMPS 2018) (OAMDI 2019) carried out by the Economic Research Forum (ERF) 
with the Egypt’s Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). 
The 2018 is the fourth round of a longitudinal survey, already administrated in 1998 
and in 2006 and 2012. Covering exactly 20 years, the survey offers a unique oppor-
tunity to understand the long-term dynamics of the Egyptian labour market and its 
reactions to policy changes (in our case trade policy). The survey is composed of 
three sections: (i) households; (ii) individuals; (iii) income. The first section, the 
household questionnaire, is administrated only by the household’s head or by the 
head’s spouse. It contains questions on basic demographic characteristics of the 
members of the household, movements of the household’s members as well as ques-
tions regarding the ownership of assets and durable goods. The second section, the 
individual questionnaire, includes questions to which each person answers individu-
ally, concerning the educational background, employment and unemployment con-
ditions and its reasons, average wage, job characteristics, mobility, job search activi-
ties, migration stories and a complete section on women’s work, their condition in 
the households and fertility. The 2018 wave dedicates more attention to measures of 
job stability, given the recent trends of the country towards higher precariousness. 
The third section encompasses all possible sort of income sources, from family-run 
agricultural and non-agricultural enterprises to transfers and remittances. The sur-
vey is representative at the national level. The ELMPS covers of the whole coun-
try, dividing it into six different macro- regions: Greater Cairo, Alexandria, Urban 
Lower Egypt, Urban Upper Egypt, Rural Lower Egypt and Rural Upper Egypt, with 
the only exception of the Frontier governorates. The final sample included 15,746 
households and 61,231 individuals.
In order to measure the impact of trade liberalization reforms, we focused on 
workers in the traded sector. Therefore, our relevant sample includes 9704 house-
holds and 18,837 individuals. A large share of workers belongs to the agricultural 
sector, followed by manufacturing (see Table 11 in “Appendix”). Note that, by con-
fining our attention to the traded sector, we may reduce the representativeness guar-
anteed by the whole ELMPS 18; but we are able to better investigate the impact of 
changes in tariffs on the workers that are directly affected by these changes.
Table 2 displays the descriptive socio-demographic statistics for our sample for 
each of the four waves. Real wage increased from 1998 until 2012, then decreased in 
2018. Most of the workforce has primary or secondary degree (the average number 
of years of schooling being around six). Only about 6% (8% in 2012) of individuals 
have a university degree or above. Around the 90% of our sample is employed in 
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unskilled (blue-collar) jobs and between 85 and 90% of the sample work in small 
or medium size firms. In 1998, 10% of the workforce was employed in public firms, 
and the percentage decreased further in the following years, in line with the styl-
ized facts mentioned above. Lastly, the data confirm that the unionization of workers 
declined over time, passing from the 13% to the 5% of workers.
The wage differential between white and blue collars, measuring the skilled/
unskilled wage gap, first widened, then stabilized for two waves, and then con-
tracted in 2018. The 2018 fall was the consequence of the different developments: a 
small contraction in blue-collar wages versus a more pronounced fall of white- col-
lar wages (Table  3). Male workers earn more than females: the gender wage gap 
increased between 1998 and 2006 to decrease afterwards (Table 4).
Workers with different individual attributes are not uniformly distributed across 
firms. Firms of different types, e.g. small vs. large and private vs. public, are charac-
terized by heterogeneous workforce composition. Table 5 details the differences in 
earnings and in years of schooling between large and small and medium enterprises, 
with large firms hiring workers with a much better education level (years of school-
ing are almost double). Table 6 shows that publicly owned enterprises (POE) pay 
higher wages and require higher levels of education than private firms. Moreover, 
not surprisingly in the MENA area, public enterprises guarantee higher percentages 
of stable jobs.
4.2  Tariff data
To assess the effects of trade liberalization processes, we match and merge the 
ELMPS worker-level data with sectoral level data those from the UN World Inte-
grated Trade Solution (WITS) database. We use the trade-weighted average of the 
Most Favoured Nation ad valorem tariff rate (or its equivalent) disaggregated at the 
3-digit level of the ISIC rev. Three classification (i.e. the maximum level of detail 
available in the ELMPS).19 In the following empirical analysis, the use of disag-
gregated tariff data guarantees a more precise picture of the policy changes as well 
as more variation. The choice of MFN tariffs rather than tariffs stemming from Pref-
erential Trade Agreements (PTA) guarantees a broader, more representative, picture 
of Egypt’s policy orientation.20 PTA tariffs, in fact, being partner specific, might 
not provide an adequate picture of a country’s general attitude towards trade policy. 
Moreover, they may not reflect the true tariff barriers to trade even towards partner 
countries due to the effective use of preferences by firms. For instance, as argued by 
Cerdeiro and Nam (2018), firms gain access to PTA tariffs only if they can meet cer-
tain rules of origin and other requirements; however, this is not always the case, and 
preferences are not always applied. Sometimes firms can explicitly decide to forgo 
access to PTA tariffs if they deem that paying the non-PTA tariffs is cheaper and 
easier than complying with the PTA requirements.
19 Note that this is the same source of data of the aggregate tariff figures discussed in the first part of the 
paper.
20 It is also worth noting that Egypt grants at least MFN treatment to all WTO Members.
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Figure 2 summarizes the trends of tariffs, wages and share of workers with a per-
manent job position (job stability) for the workers included in our sample. Although, 
as discusses above, the sample includes traded sectors only, the overall trends are 
consistent with the general figures for Egypt showed in the first part of the paper.
Table 2  Descriptive statistics 
for our working sample
a Wages are expressed as the natural logarithm of real hourly wages, 
expressed in 2018 Egyptian pounds using the Consumer Price Index
1998 2006 2012 2018
Real wage (ln)a 2.105 2.212 2.340 2.182
Male 0.491 0.509 0.618 0.524
Age 35.050 34.910 35.410 36.090
Urban 0.429 0.288 0.248 0.182
Married 0.614 0.656 0.730 0.750
Years of schooling 5.329 5.537 6.683 6.479
Primary-intermediate ed 0.936 0.936 0.917 0.933
Tertiary ed 0.064 0.064 0.083 0.067
Blue-collar 0.893 0.919 0.914 0.930
SME 0.857 0.929 0.840 0.867
POE 0.100 0.059 0.060 0.037
Trade union 0.134 0.082 0.061 0.053
N 4034 6927 6862 9181
Table 3  Wages differential 
between white and blue collars 
across years
a Following Zaki (2014), we distinguish blue-collar workers (agricul-
ture and production workers), from white-collar workers (clerical; 
technical and scientific; managers; sales and services)
b The wage gap is calculated as the difference between the natural log 
of average wages of blue- and white-collar workers
1998 2006 2012 2018
Real wage (ln) 2.105 2.212 2.340 2.182
Blue-collar wage 1.976 2.073 2.233 2.136
White-collar wage 2.462 2.640 2.805 2.438
Wage gap 0.486 0.576 0.572 0.302
N 1325 1891 2619 2974
Table 4  Wages across gender 
across years
1998 2006 2012 2018
Real wage (ln) 2.105 2.212 2.340 2.182
Female 1.829 1.817 2.179 2.019
Male 2.134 2.261 2.351 2.195
Gender wage gap 0.305 0.444 0.172 0.176




We aim at testing the effect of tariff changes on job market outcomes. Our empirical 
specification follows Galiani and Porto (2010). Their approach consists of regressing 
Table 5  Wages and years of 
schooling across SME and large 
firms
1998 2006 2012 2018
Large firms (above 100 employees)
 Real wage (ln) 2.224 2.296 2.592 2.309
 Years of schooling 10.410 11.060 11.210 10.440
Small and medium firms
 Real wage (ln) 1.950 2.080 2.235 2.145
 Years of schooling 5.953 5.074 6.119 6.335
N 868 3463 4770 5338
Table 6  Wages and years of 
schooling across private and 
public firms
*Publicly owned enterprises include both government and state-
owned enterprises
a Job stability is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when a worker 
reports to have a ‘permanent’ contract, whereas it takes the value of 
0 for seasonal, casual and temporary contracts
1998 2006 2012 2018
Private firms
 Real wage (ln) 1.973 2.105 2.266 2.146
 Job  stabilitya 0.859 0.913 0.782 0.752
 Years of schooling 4.783 5.200 6.377 6.275
Publicly owned firms*
 Real wage (ln) 2.398 2.607 2.739 2.524
 Job stability 0.955 0.917 0.921 0.935
 Years of schooling 10.16 10.91 11.52 11.67
N 4029 6926 6860 9162
Fig. 2  Trend in tariffs, wages, job stability and employment
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individual wages for the entire time span on both individual-level characteristics and 
industry-level characteristics (in our case sectoral tariffs) directly in one stage.21 We 
employ the following baseline specifications:
where yi,t is the job market outcome dependent variable for worker (or individual) 
i in year t = {1998, 2006, 2012, 2018}. We use two job market outcome variables: 
(i) the natural logarithm of the real wage; (ii) a dummy equal to 1 if the worker has 
a stable job. Our variable of interest,  , is the natural logarithm of the tariff rate22 
defined at the 3-digit sector level in which the worker operates in the last 3 months 
before the interview. We consider tariffs in levels lagged by 1  year (i.e. the year 
before the survey) to reduce simultaneity concerns and to take into account the fact 
that tariff changes may display their effect after some time. Since the different sur-
veys are not equally spaced over the observed time span, (wage and tariff) changes 
can only be defined over the observed period of k years from one survey wave to the 
other. To tackle this issue, we annualized the change by dividing it by k. The con-
trol variables vector, xi,t , includes: (i) basic individual attributes such as age, gen-
der, married status, whether they live in urban setting; (ii) worker’s characteristics as 
skill, proxied either by blue-collar status, education attainment, or years of school-
ing; participation to a trade union and the formal/informal status of the worker; 
(iii) firm’s characteristics such as size (small and medium = 1–100, large = above 
100 employees), publicly owned enterprise (POE) and foreign-owned firms.23 
Based on the above specifications, as explained more in detail in the next section, 
we estimate a pooled cross-section OLS, a fixed effect panel OLS and a first-dif-
ference OLS. Additionally, depending on the specification, we include: year fixed 
effects; sector fixed effects (at 2- or 3-digit level); Egypt’s governorate fixed effects; 








21 A different methodology has also been used in the literature. It employs a two-stage estimation strat-
egy (see for instance Feliciano 2001; Kumar and Mishra 2008) where in the first equation the individ-
ual salary is regressed on individual characteristics and on an industry dummy for each year separately. 
Then, the industry wage premium is regressed on a set of industry-specific characteristics, among which 
also the indicator for trade liberalization. As highlighted in Murakami (2020) adopting this approach 
rules out the possibility to interact individual characteristics with sector-specific tariff levels. Moreover, 
the second stage estimation may suffer from small sample bias.
22 Specifically,  = ln(tariff + 1) . This a common definition, for instance used in Murakami (2020) and 
Di Comite et al. (2018) among others. This definition implies that the coefficients can be immediately 
read as elasticities. Moreover, it is particularly useful when tariff rate levels are very different between 
sectors, as in Egypt, because it allows to consider that, for instance, a 1 p.p. tariff rate increase provides 
different additional protection depending on the initial tariff rate level.
23 Although not shown in the paper but available on request, we run the baseline and first-difference 
regressions including among the regressors the initial level of tariffs (in 1998) and the log of imports. 
The inclusion of these two controls does not alter our results.
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governorate-sector fixed effects; worker fixed effects (i.e. a panel regression).24 The 
term εi, denotes the error.
Since the observation unit is the individual worker but tariffs are observed for the 
3-digit sectors in which the workers operate, the source of variation in the worker-
level tariff includes both within-sector changes due to trade policy decisions (i.e. 
tariff changes) as well as between-sector changes due to workers (or firms) moving 
across sectors, which of course is not directly due to the trade policy. In our data, 
this is an issue of little practical relevance as the share of workers who explicitly 
report to have changed sector is negligible (below 6%). Hence, we do not address the 
issue in this paper.
Building on the above specifications, we also investigate the possible asymmetric 
effects of tariff increases and decreases. To this aim, we decompose tariff changes 
and create a tariff increase dummy, It−1 , defined over the k-periods between consecu-
tive surveys and employ the following specification:
Note that this corresponds to a model with a single interaction term:
where  = − and  = + − − . In this case, however, the first specification makes it 
easier to read the coefficients since + is the effect of a 1% tariff increase and − is 
the effect of a 1% tariff decrease.
Another way to capture this asymmetry is to allow for nonlinearities, for instance 
by including a quadratic term in the regression:
where the  coefficient governs the curvature of the equation. In this case, however, 
interpreting the asymmetry from the regression output is not immediate and calcu-
lating the margins or the marginal effects is preferable.
We employ a similar approach to investigate possible asymmetries due to skill 
and gender. In this case, however, since we are primarily interested in the existence 
of a gap, i.e. whether δ ≷ 0, the single-interaction specification is preferable:
where UnSkilli is a dummy equal to one if the worker is unskilled, proxied by blue-
collar status, and Malei is a male dummy.












































24 In other versions of our regressions, not reported in the paper but available on request, we also include 




4.4  Endogeneity and identification strategy
As explained in the previous section, we investigate the relationship between tariffs 
and labour outcomes adopting several specifications, controlling for several observ-
able characteristics of the workers as well as for different combinations of fixed 
effects capturing unobserved factors. As it will emerge clearly in the next section, 
our analysis aims at checking the existence of a negative correlation between tar-
iffs and wages in Egypt for the 1998–2018 period. Caution is required in the inter-
pretation of our results as causal effects. A major concern, widely discussed in the 
literature, regards the endogeneity of trade policy measures. Market labour condi-
tions can be easily thought to influence the trade policy implemented by govern-
ments and trade barriers are often raised in the attempt to protect firms and workers 
from import competition. A vast theoretical and empirical literature investigated the 
political economy of trade policy and the possible role played by industry lobbies 
and interest groups in the determination of trade policy outcomes. Due to lobby-
ing, governments may deviate from the socially optimal trade policy and partially 
accommodate demands from politically organized sectors. The equilibrium trade 
policy entails different levels of protection in the different sectors contingent on their 
political contributions.25
We fully recognize these concerns. Yet, in the case of Egypt there are several 
elements suggesting that trade policy reforms are likely to be driven by external fac-
tors. First, as mentioned in the first part of the paper, the liberalization waves essen-
tially followed the indications of the international institutions as the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (first) and the WTO (later), or a countrywide 
attempt to internationalize the economy, thus making tariffs in Egypt “less likely to 
be endogenous than those in other countries” (Salem and Zaki 2019). Second, and 
consistently with the previous point, tariff trends were very similar across industries 
as shown by the correlations in Table 1, and this co-movements of tariffs, in turn, 
suggests an absence of interference or lobbying from the private sector (see Erten 
et al. 2019).
However, to address the potential endogeneity problem linked with the reduction 
of tariffs, we instrument tariff changes with lagged tariff levels (i.e. previous sur-
vey year) and pre-liberalization tariffs (i.e. before the starting of the second wave 
of tariff reforms). This strategy is in line with some seminal papers in this field as 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) and Bigsten et al. (2016); moreover, it seems appro-
priate given the history of tariff reforms in Egypt, as discussed above. The exclu-
sion restriction requires that our instruments, past tariff levels, does not directly 
contribute to changes in workers’ wages (and probability of finding a stable job) 
several years after, as seems plausible, while they instead influence subsequent tariff 
changes. This is in fact what one would expect in a generalized tariff reform as the 
25 On this issue see the seminal paper by Grossman and Helpman (1994) and the vast following theo-
retical and empirical literature. More recently, Annicchiarico and Marvasi (2019) generalized the results 
showing how they hold under more general conditions even for monopolistically competitive sectors with 
variable elasticity of substitution and when tariff pass-through is incomplete.
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one that took place in Egypt. The negative correlation between tariffs and subse-
quent tariff changes (computed as − 0.52 meaning that tariff reductions were larger 
in more protected sectors) supports this exclusion restriction.
5  Econometric analysis
5.1  The effect of tariffs on wages and job stability
Let us start from a baseline specification in logarithms to which we add several rel-
evant control variables as well as different combinations of fixed effects in order 
to absorb different possible sources of unobserved variability. We report the main 
results in Table 7.26 The first four specifications (columns 1–4) are cross-sectional 
pooled OLS estimations; below the coefficients, we report robust standard errors 
clustered at the sectoral level to consider possible correlations within industries. 
Model 1 includes our main explanatory variables and all the controls as well as fixed 
effects at the governorate level and at the 2-digit sector level, to capture industry-
specific, time-invariant fixed characteristics. In Model 2 we add fixed effects at the 
governorate-sector level. The following two models mirror the previous ones, but 
at a more disaggregated level. In Model 3, we include 3-digit industry fixed effects 
and in Model 4 fixed effects at the governorate-3-digit sector level. Lastly, Model 5 
reports the results of the panel estimation with worker-level fixed effects and robust 
standard errors, thus controlling for all the observable and unobservable time-invari-
ant individual-specific characteristics as sex, individual talent etc.27
Table  7 shows that the coefficient of tariff is negative and significant through-
out all the specifications suggesting that tariffs are negatively correlated with real 
wages. The numerical size of the coefficient remains quite stable across the different 
specifications: a 1% tariff increase is associated with real wage decrease that span 
from 0.05 to 0.1%, other things equal.28 These numbers are consistent with similar 
studies on Egypt as Aboushady et  al. (2019) and Zaki (2014). The negative cor-
relation between tariffs and wages seems a specific characteristic of the Egyptian 
economy as results from other countries, such as for instance for Argentina in the 
26 To ensure that our results do not depend on few extreme values or misreporting errors, the results pre-
sented in this section exclude outliers for our key variables, namely wages and tariffs (i.e. observations 
below the 1st and above the 99th percentiles). The exclusion of outliers does not significantly affect the 
results.
27 In the panel estimations all the time-invariant regressors are absorbed by worker fixed effects. This 
applies, for instance, to the gender dummy, which is then dropped, and to governorate and sector dum-
mies, although not perfectly due to a small fraction of individuals moving. Moreover, the fact that work-
ers are not perfectly nested within sectors prevents the use of clustered standard errors in the panel 
estimations. As a check, we repeated the panel estimation with 3-digit sector fixed effect and clustered 
standard errors on workers that did not change sector, with consistent results.
28 As mentioned in the data description, the industry composition of the survey sample is skewed 
towards agriculture and manufacturing. As a further control, we checked our results on agriculture and 




study by Galiani and Porto (2010), reach opposite results, suggesting that the effect 
of tariffs is ultimately an empirical question. In our regressions, the coefficients of 
the control variables are in line with expectations. The effect of age and of being 
married is positive and significant. We detect the presence of both a skill and a gen-
der wage gap: on average, a male worker earns around a 20% higher wage than a 
Table 7  Baseline regressions for real wage in levels
Robust standard errors in parentheses. S.E. are clustered at the 3-digit sector level in models (1) to (4)
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Real wage (ln) Real wage (ln) Real wage (ln) Real wage (ln) Real wage (ln)
Tarifft-1 (ln) − 0.064*** − 0.071*** − 0.104*** − 0.104*** − s0.053***
(0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029) (0.016)
Age 0.004** 0.004** 0.004*** 0.004** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Male 0.223*** 0.200*** 0.221*** 0.202***
(0.027) (0.022) (0.025) (0.020)
Urban 0.024 0.034 0.025 0.022 0.473**
(0.026) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025) (0.201)
Married 0.151*** 0.156*** 0.150*** 0.149*** 0.174***
(0.027) (0.031) (0.028) (0.032) (0.040)
Formal 0.117*** 0.109*** 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.053
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.024) (0.050)
SME − 0.003 0.023 − 0.015 0.009 0.019
(0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.032) (0.046)
POE 0.024 0.037 0.030 0.017 − 0.018
(0.032) (0.038) (0.030) (0.041) (0.081)
Union 0.292*** 0.276*** 0.289*** 0.286*** 0.131**
(0.031) (0.031) (0.028) (0.027) (0.055)
Foreign ownership 0.667** 0.722** 0.694*** 1.059*** 0.911***
(0.246) (0.287) (0.248) (0.193) (0.327)
Blue collar − 0.143*** − 0.131*** − 0.144*** − 0.127*** − 0.043
(0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.060)
Constant 2.101*** 2.251*** 2.168*** 2.300*** 1.732***
(0.111) (0.124) (0.112) (0.122) (0.121)
Observations 7111 7111 7111 7111 7111
R-squared 0.230 0.316 0.236 0.331 0.067
Governorate f.e. [22] Yes Yes Yes Yes No
2-Digit sector f.e. [38] Yes Yes No No No
3-Digit sector f.e. [64] No No Yes Yes No
Gov-sector f.e. 
[576/724]
No Yes No Yes No
Worker f.e No No No No Yes
Number of id 5667
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female worker and a blue-collar worker is penalized with a wage that is about 13% 
lower than a white-collar worker; furthermore, working in the formal sector assures 
almost a 11% higher wage. On the other hand, we find no clear evidence in favour of 
an urban bias (the urban dummy coefficient is positive but insignificant in all specifi-
cations but the panel). Members of trade unions display a wage premium, as well as 
foreign-owned enterprise workers, while workers in small and medium firms and in 
private firms do not seem penalized.
Results from Table  7 control for several time invariant factors. However, these 
results might be influenced by aggregate trends and labour market dynamics. To 
control for this possibility and exclude that our results are driven by macro-trends, 
we run our estimations controlling also for time effects. Fully controlling for both 
time and disaggregated sector fixed effects is, of course, the preferable empirical 
strategy, but it requires richer data with several survey waves and a more balanced 
panel (e.g. the study by Galiani and Porto (2010), uses almost 30 years of data com-
ing from 40 surveys, with over 29,000 observations). Having just four survey waves 
and a highly unbalanced panel, also due the long time span between survey waves, 
we can investigate the time dimension only by reducing the sectoral detail. Specifi-
cally, we check our results including in the model year fixed effects, a linear trend, 
governorate-specific and sector-specific linear trends, together with sector dummies 
(in this case at 1-digit level). We report results in Table 16 in “Appendix”. Estimates 
are robust to the inclusion of time effects and the negative effect of tariffs remains 
significant in all specifications, thus confirming that tariffs acted as a specific chan-
nel other than the exchange rate and other macroeconomic changes. To further con-
trol for omitted time-invariant characteristics, we also investigate the effect of tar-
iff increases on wage increases. The parameter of interest keeps its interpretation 
of elasticity; hence, its economic sense is the same as in the previous models. But 
now the addition of control variables captures the fact that the different categories of 
workers may experience different rates of growth of their wages rather than different 
wage levels. Unfortunately, running the models in differences implies a reduction in 
the number of observations due to the panel being unbalanced, and thus entails some 
loss of information. Despite the exclusion of workers observed only in 1 year (or 
not observed in consecutive years) may introduce a selection bias into the analysis, 
results hold. Model 1 and Model 2 of Table 8 include fixed effects at the governorate 
and at 3-digit sector level. In line with our previous findings, tariff changes are nega-
tively correlated with real wage changes, other things equal. The numerical size of 
the coefficient (− 0.08–0.09) is also comparable with previous estimates. Due to the 
loss of observations with respect to the models in levels, Model 2, which replicates 
Model 1, excludes some controls. Again, results are robust. Lastly, note that the fact 
that most of the control variables are now statistically insignificant—with the excep-
tion of age, foreign ownership and unionization—is not in contrast with our previ-
ous estimates since the interpretation of the control variables is now different. For 
instance, foreign-owned firms’ workers are found to benefit from both higher wages 
(models in levels) and higher wage growth (models in differences); older workers, 
instead, display higher wages but the age-related gains slow down over time.
Model 3 and 4 of Table 8 report results of the second stage of the IV regressions, 
where changes in tariffs have been instrumented with lagged levels of tariffs and 
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pre-liberalization tariffs. Again, our results hold, with the coefficient of tariffs nega-
tive and significant. Under-identification and weak instruments tests do not reject 
our instruments choice. With a Chi-squared p-value of 0.0158, the under-identifica-
tion test confirms our model; moreover, the high numerical value of the F-statistics 
of the first stage 10 (444.72) suggests that our analysis does not seem to suffer from 
weak instruments.
Lastly, we did some further checks on our results by investigating possible heter-
ogeneity by sector and by subperiods. We report the full tables of results in “Appen-
dix” for space reasons. For what concerns sectors, we report results for food and tex-
tile, chosen because of their peculiarities: the food sector was the only one following 
a different trend, while the textile sector was hit by a major external shock during the 
period of analysis: the end of the Multi-Fibre Agreement. Excluding the food and 
the textile sectors as well as adding tariff-sector interactions confirms our results, 
even though some degree of sectoral heterogeneity seems to exist, especially for the 
food sector. Finally, focusing on subperiods also produces coherent results.
Let us now investigate the effects of tariff reforms on job stability of workers, 
that is on the probability of having a permanent position. Reading together our main 
results on wages with those on job stability allows us to better understand the pos-
sible effects of the tariff reforms in Egypt. As our previous findings suggest, tar-
iff increases are associated with wage reductions. If obtaining a permanent position 
becomes more likely, it may partly compensate the workers thus attenuating the 
negative effects due to higher tariffs. If, instead, wage reductions come together with 
increased job instability, then the position of workers worsens even more.
Our dependent variable is now a job stability dummy. The econometric specifica-
tions follow the previous analysis. Note that job stability is observed only for sub-
jects who work, as in the wage regressions; however, the number of observations is 
larger, allowing us to better exploit the data. Since the dependent variable is binary, 
our results refer to the probability to have a permanent position. We present the 
results from linear probability models (LPM) estimated through OLS.29 We report 
all the main results in Table 9. Model 1 include tariffs in levels, while in Model 2 
we use changes in tariffs. Both Models have governorate and 3-digit industry fixed 
effects as well as robust standard errors clustered for sectors. Model 3 is a worker-
fixed effects panel regression with robust standard error and, Model 4, reports the 
IV estimation, with pre-liberalization and lagged tariff levels as instruments. In all 
specifications, tariffs are negatively correlated with job stability.
29 A linear probability model (LPM) presents some advantages as well as disadvantages. In the context 
of panel data or with endogenous dummies, as in our case, LPM is preferable to probit or logit (Angrist 
2001; Angrist and Pischke 2008; Wooldrige 2002). The main disadvantage regards the risk of obtaining 
estimated probabilities outside the 0–1 range. Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) discuss the issue and propose a 
trimmed estimator that yields unbiased estimates. In our case, the issue seems of little practical relevance 
because the share of predicted probabilities outside the 0–1 interval is very low (about 5.6%). Moreover, 
the Horrace–Oaxaca trimming estimator yields similar or even stronger results. Finally, to be sure, we 
also estimated a probit model, with consistent results.
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5.2  Asymmetric effects and inequality
Our results indicate a negative effect of tariffs on wages of Egyptian workers. 
This effect, however, represents an average obtained by holding constant several 
observable and unobservable factors. In this section we disentangle the possible 
existence of some types of asymmetries and unequal effects by type of workers. 
Specifically, we focus on the potential asymmetry between tariff increases and 
decreases, and on unequal effects by workers’ skill and gender.
Table 8  First differences and Instrumental Variable regression for changes in wages
Robust standard errors in parentheses. S.E. are clustered at the 3-digit sector level. IV first stage: Under-
identification test: Chi-squared p-value of 0.0158; weak instruments F-statistics 444.72
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Variables (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) IV (4) IV
Δ Wage Δ Wage Δ Wage Δ Wage
Δ  Tarifft-1 (ln) − 0.091*** − 0.084*** − 0.112*** − 0.105***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.020)
Age − 0.001*** − 0.001*** − 0.001*** − 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Sex 0.017 0.012 0.007 0.004
(0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012)
Urban 0.009 0.009 0.013 0.012
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Married 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.008
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Formal − 0.000 0.006 − 0.008 0.002
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
SME 0.001 − 0.003
(0.008) (0.009)
POE − 0.005 0.008 − 0.003 0.010
(0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
Union 0.034*** 0.037***
(0.011) (0.011)
Foreign ownership 0.152** 0.135** 0.077*** 0.058***
(0.062) (0.065) (0.015) (0.017)
Blue collar 0.002 − 0.005 − 0.001 − 0.008
(0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008)
Constant 0.048** 0.057*** 0.074*** 0.076***
(0.023) (0.018) (0.022) (0.020)
Observations 1525 1720 1334 1505
R-squared 0.097 0.085 0.104 0.089
Governorate f.e. [22] Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-Digit sector f.e. [64] Yes Yes Yes Yes
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As highlighted in the first part of the paper, during the last two decades, tariffs 
changes were not unidirectional nor smooth: the liberalization period was followed 
by a return to protectionism, and even during the liberalization period tariff reduc-
tions were not uniform with even some tariff increases. We use this source of vari-
ability to uncover the potential asymmetric effects of tariff increases vis à vis tariff 
Table 9  Main results for job stability
Robust standard errors in parentheses. S.E. are clustered at the 3-digit sector level
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Variables (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) IV
Job stability Job stability Job stability Job stability
Tarifft-1 (ln) − 0.106 − 0.074***
(0.090) (0.011)
Δ  Tarifft-1 (ln) − 0.769** − 0.961***
(0.300) (0.281)
Age 0.005*** 0.006*** − 0.014*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Sex − 0.101** − 0.104 − 0.004
(0.040) (0.079) (0.027)
Urban − 0.003 0.020 − 0.050 0.031
(0.022) (0.033) (0.097) (0.035)
Married − 0.009 0.034* 0.003 0.015
(0.041) (0.018) (0.027) (0.012)
Formal 0.065 0.013 − 0.003 − 0.020
(0.039) (0.030) (0.034) (0.030)
SME 0.048** 0.065* 0.114** 0.055
(0.023) (0.035) (0.048) (0.037)
POE 0.094*** 0.095*** 0.051 0.099***
(0.018) (0.026) (0.035) (0.022)
Union 0.182 0.486*** 0.924*** 0.494***
(0.177) (0.103) (0.048) (0.042)
Foreign ownership 0.005 − 0.041 − 0.079** − 0.060
(0.020) (0.034) (0.036) (0.038)
Blue collar 0.200*** 0.124*** 0.129*** 0.157***
(0.023) (0.036) (0.036) (0.025)
Constant 0.565*** 0.431** 1.373*** 0.394**
(0.071) (0.190) (0.081) (0.158)
Observations 11,713 3706 11,713 3176
R-squared 0.143 0.204 0.056 0.216
Governorate f.e. [22] Yes Yes No Yes
3-Digit sector f.e. [64] Yes Yes No Yes
Worker f.e No No Yes Yes
Number of id 8863
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reductions. To this end, as discussed in the methodology section, we first decom-
pose tariff changes into its positive and negative components and then we further 
allow for nonlinear effects by introducing a quadratic term. Since the effect of tariffs 
now comes from the interaction terms, results are more clearly visualized by look-
ing at predictive margins and marginal effects. This is done is Fig. 3 for wages and 
in Fig. 4 for job stability. The full regression tables are reported in “Appendix” in 
Table 12. The left panel of Fig. 3 displays the predictive margins for wages from 
the model in which we separate tariff increases and decreases (see Models 1 and 
2 of Table 12). Tariff liberalization and protection yield different outcomes: tariff 
reductions have a slightly positive effect on wages; however, this effect is not sta-
tistically different from zero; on the contrary, tariff increases reduce wages. While 
most of the literature treats tariff changes as symmetric, our results seem to support 
the idea that they are in fact asymmetric: a 1% increase in tariffs is associated with 
a 0.12% reduction in wages; on the contrary, a decrease in tariffs brings about only 
minor increases in wages or none at all (see Model 1 of Table 12). Results from the 
model allowing for a nonlinear effect of tariff changes confirm these findings. The 
central and right panels of Fig. 3 (obtained from Model 3 of Table 12) show that the 
negative effect of tariff changes on wages tends to become larger for tariff increases. 
Looking at the confidence intervals the magnitude of the effect has some degree of 
uncertainty, but the effect is negative for tariff increases, while it is indistinguish-
able from zero for tariff decreases below 10% approximately. Very similar findings 
apply to job stability, as shown Fig. 4 (see also Model 4, 5 and 6 in Table 12).30 This 
implies that tariff liberalization, even if relatively large, do not seem to negatively 
impact workers’ wages nor job stability, while protectionism is harmful as it tends to 
reduce wages and make job positions more unstable.
We now consider possible unequal effects of tariffs on skill and gender. Results 
for the variables of interest are reported in Table  10 (Table  13 reports the coeffi-
cients of all the regressors). The interaction terms in Models 1 and 2 are insignificant 
Fig. 3  The asymmetric effect on wages of tariff increase and decreases
30 Note also that, as also discussed earlier the use of a linear probability model is supported by predictive 










































suggesting that we are unable to detect an unequal effect of tariff changes on wages, 
either by skill or gender.
Tariff increase has a stronger negative effect on job stability of blue collars, while 
no asymmetric effect is found for gender. Note that in the gender models (i.e. Mod-
els 2 and 4) although the coefficient of tariff changes becomes insignificant, its mar-
ginal effect is negative and significant, consistently with other estimations. All in 
all, while we find that tariff increases and decreases yield asymmetric effects, our 
results—possibly also due to data constraints31—do not allow us to detect the exist-
ence of asymmetries by skill and gender, except for the case of unskilled workers 
whose job stability seems more negatively impacted by protectionist measures.
Table 10  Unequal effects by skill and gender, coefficients of interest
Robust standard errors in parentheses. S.E. are clustered at the 3-digit sector level
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ Wage Δ Wage Job stability Job stability
Δ  Tarifft-1 − 0.098*** − 0.102 − 0.352*** − 0.715
(0.029) (0.088) (0.113) (0.542)
Δ  Tarifft-1 (ln) × blue collar 0.008 − 0.476*
(0.040) (0.246)
Δ  Tarifft-1 (ln) × male 0.012 − 0.061
(0.093) (0.325)
Blue collar 0.002 0.002 − 0.050 − 0.041
(0.008) (0.009) (0.037) (0.034)
Male 0.017 0.018 − 0.101 − 0.110
(0.011) (0.015) (0.080) (0.109)
(other regressors omitted)
Observations 1525 1525 3706 3706
R-squared 0.097 0.097 0.207 0.204
Governorate f.e. [22] Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-Digit sector f.e. [64] Yes Yes Yes Yes
31 To explore this possibility, we checked our results with less demanding specifications, i.e. by using 
2-digit sector fixed effects and standard errors clustered at that level. Results indicate that relative to 
skilled workers, unskilled workers might be more negatively affected by tariff increases not only in terms 
of job stability but also in terms of wages, and that female workers may suffer more than males in terms 
of job stability. These results, however, may be driven by cross-sector characteristics not adequately 
taken into account by the specification used. It is possible that richer datasets might allow researchers to 




During the 1990s, as several other developing economies and first among the 
MENA countries, Egypt undertook a policy of trade liberalization and concur-
rent labour market reforms. Despite large tariff reductions, which increased 
the openness of the country, Egypt remained one of the most protected econo-
mies of the area. At the same time, the reforms were not enough to address all 
the structural issues of Egypt’s labour market and yielded mixed results. More 
recently, after the 2008 financial crisis and the 2011 Spring Revolution, the coun-
try reverted to protection. Whether and to what extent tariff changes alleviated or 
worsened Egyptian workers’ conditions is an open question with relevant policy 
implications.
In this paper we investigate the possible effects of tariff reforms on labour mar-
ket outcomes. Thanks to the recently released 2018 ELMPS, merging the avail-
able four survey waves with 3-digit tariff data from WITS, we are able to investi-
gate the relation between tariff changes and workers’ wages and job stability over 
the 1998–2018 period, therefore performing de facto a long run analysis of this 
relationship to check if workers are hurt or have gained from different tariff poli-
cies and if different categories of workers are penalised/favoured in different way.
As compared to the wide theoretical and empirical literature on the relation 
between openness and the labour market (Harrison et  al. 2011), few studies 
focused on Egypt, highlighting a negative correlation between tariffs and labour 
market outcomes, with unequal effects among workers (Zaki 2014). We con-
tribute to this strand of the literature by analysing a longer time span including 
recently released data and, most importantly, investigating the possible asymmet-
ric effects of tariff increases and decreases.
Our findings suggest that protectionist measures, implemented also in recent 
years, may have failed to protect workers and did not bring benefits in terms of 
labour market outcomes: tariff increases were correlated with reductions in the 
workers’ real wages and with a lower probability of having a permanent position. 
Furthermore, the effects of tariff changes are likely to be asymmetric: tariff increases 
and decreases, as expected, bring about opposite effects, and of different magnitude. 
The negative overall effect of tariff changes, consistently with the (scant) literature 
on Egypt, suggests that tariffs do not protect workers. Additionally, the asymme-
try of the effects implies that protectionism does more harm than liberalizations do 
good. Previous liberalization waves, strongly supported by international organiza-
tions, have not been followed by significant changes in workers’ real wages, or, if 
any, the effect was only mildly positive. On the contrary, tariff increases are associ-
ated with non-negligible wage reductions. If Egyptian workers’ conditions deterio-
rated after the crises, the main causes have probably not much to do with increased 
import competition and tariff reductions of the previous liberalization waves, but 
mainly with other internal and external factors. Based on our results, the subsequent 
tariff increases may have further worsened workers’ conditions.
However, the aggregate results may hide important sources of heterogeneity 
between the different type of workers in the different sectors. This heterogeneity 
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has implications for wage inequality, which is another relevant aspect of the 
labour market that must be considered in policy evaluations. To partly address 
this issue, we investigated sector specificities, for two important sectors for Egypt: 
food and textile. Moreover, we checked the presence of asymmetries by skills and 
gender both for wages and job stability. Not surprisingly, white-collars (skilled) 
and male workers display a wage premium relative to blue-collars (unskilled) and 
females, other things equal. Tariff changes do not seem to affect these wage gaps, 
while they negatively affect job stability of blue-collars.
Overall, our findings support the view that protectionism tends to hamper work-
ing conditions as well as increase inequality, while liberalizations did not improve 
nor deteriorate them. Note however that several caveats can apply. First, despite the 
fact that our results hold across several specifications (including IV) and although 
trade liberalizations in Egypt followed the indications of international institutions 
and were implemented similarly across sectors, which should reduce the possibil-
ity of endogeneity (Salem and Zaki 2019), a strict causal interpretation is probably 
still not warranted at this stage, also due to data limitations. Moreover, our sample 
covers only part of the economy, i.e. the formal labour market and tradeable sectors, 
thus our results must be understood as partial equilibrium analysis focusing on the 
individual effects. Further studies should address a series of important general equi-
librium aspects including, among others, possible cross-sectoral effects.
While our and previous results consistently point towards a negative correlation 
between tariffs and wages in Egypt, more research is required to appropriately draw 
precise policy indications. Yet, our findings have important policy implications. The 
evidence that tariff increases are negatively associated with subsequent deteriora-
tion in labour market outcomes of workers is at odds with the recent decision of the 
Egyptian government to protect some of its sectors, even if these measures may help 
reducing the country’s trade deficit. Furthermore, our results add to a recent one by 
Zarzoso et al. (2018), who find a negative association between tariffs and total factor 
productivity. Trade protection, thus, may hamper the (already low) internationaliza-
tion of Egyptian firms and participation into global value chains, slowing down the 
growth of more productive firms and worsening workers’ conditions.
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See Tables 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16.
Table 11  Sectoral composition of workers




 Food, beverages and tobacco 618
 Textiles and apparel 594
 Leather and related products 577
 Paper, paper products and wood 271
 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 358
 Coke and refined petroleum products 250
 Chemicals and chemical products 258
 Pharmaceutical products 113
 Rubber and plastics products 104
 Other non-metallic mineral products 408
 Basic metals 205
 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 314
 Computer, electronic and optical products 192
 Electrical equipment 137
 Machinery and equipment n.e.c 199
 Motor vehicles, trailers and other transportation equipment 166
 Furniture 645
 Other manufacturing 31





Table 12  The asymmetric effects of tariff increase and decreases (full table)
Robust standard errors in parentheses. S.E. are clustered at the 3-digit sector level
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ Wage Δ Wage Δ Wage Job stability Job stability Job stability
|Δ  Tarifft-1 (ln)| × Incr − 0.124*** − 0.184*** − 1.396*** − 1.584***
(0.035) (0.046) (0.490) (0.536)
|Δ  Tarifft-1 (ln)| × Decr 0.060 0.188
(0.039) (0.201)
|Δ  Tarifft-1 (ln)| 0.060 0.188
(0.039) (0.201)
Δ  Tarifft-1 − 0.094*** − 0.813***
(0.024) (0.284)
(Δ  Tarifft-1)2 − 0.100* − 1.076*
(0.059) (0.548)
Age − 0.001*** − 0.001*** − 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male 0.017 0.017 0.017 − 0.093 − 0.093 − 0.088
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.061) (0.061) (0.064)
Urban 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.019 0.019 0.021
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034)
Married 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.035** 0.035** 0.034**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Formal − 0.001 − 0.001 − 0.001 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.126***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033)
SME 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
POE − 0.004 − 0.004 − 0.004 0.070** 0.070** 0.067**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Union 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.088***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
Foreign ownership 0.147** 0.147** 0.146** 0.403*** 0.403*** 0.422***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.060) (0.113) (0.113) (0.121)
Blue collar 0.002 0.002 0.002 − 0.045 − 0.045 − 0.045
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Constant 0.055** 0.055** 0.054** 0.539*** 0.539*** 0.471***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.156) (0.156) (0.173)
Observations 1525 1525 1525 3706 3706 3706
R-squared 0.098 0.098 0.099 0.217 0.217 0.214
Governorate f.e. [22] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-Digit sector f.e. [64] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 13  Unequal effects by skill and gender (full table)
Robust standard errors in parentheses. S.E. are clustered at the 3-digit sector level
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ Wage Δ Wage Job stability Job stability
Δ  Tarifft-1 − 0.098*** − 0.102 − 0.352*** − 0.715
(0.029) (0.088) (0.113) (0.542)
Δ  Tarifft-1 (ln) × blue collar 0.008 − 0.476*
(0.040) (0.246)
Δ  Tarifft-1 (ln) × male 0.012 − 0.061
(0.093) (0.325)
Blue collar 0.002 0.002 − 0.050 − 0.041
(0.008) (0.009) (0.037) (0.034)
Male 0.017 0.018 − 0.101 − 0.110
(0.011) (0.015) (0.080) (0.109)
Age − 0.001*** − 0.001*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Urban 0.009 0.009 0.021 0.020
(0.008) (0.008) (0.033) (0.033)
Married 0.002 0.002 0.036** 0.034*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.017) (0.017)
Formal − 0.000 − 0.000 0.127*** 0.123***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.035) (0.036)
SME 0.001 0.001 0.019 0.013
(0.008) (0.008) (0.030) (0.029)
POE − 0.005 − 0.005 0.057 0.065*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.034) (0.035)
Union 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.107*** 0.095***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.026) (0.025)
Foreign ownership 0.152** 0.151** 0.472*** 0.487***
(0.062) (0.061) (0.112) (0.106)
Constant 0.048** 0.047** 0.429** 0.437**
(0.023) (0.020) (0.189) (0.209)
Observations 1525 1525 3706 3706
R-squared 0.097 0.097 0.207 0.204
Governorate f.e. [22] Yes Yes Yes Yes
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Further information on trade and trade policy in Egypt
The information reported in this section provides some additional details that com-
plement the discussion on Egypt’s trade policy reforms done in Sect. 3 of the paper.
The liberalization policies followed in Egypt in the 1990s increased the (low) 
international projection of the economy, even though import protection remained 
Table 15  Wage regressions, subperiods
Robust standard errors in parentheses. S.E. are clustered at the 3-digit sector level
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01









Tarifft-1 (ln) − 0.181*** − 0.052**
(0.026) (0.020)
Δ  Tarifft-1 (ln) 0.017 − 0.087***
(0.037) (0.025)
Age 0.006*** 0.002** − 0.001** − 0.002***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Sex 0.265*** 0.152*** 0.017 0.010
(0.027) (0.040) (0.018) (0.012)
Urban 0.025 0.030 0.001 0.010
(0.024) (0.033) (0.014) (0.011)
Married 0.129*** 0.113*** − 0.000 0.009
(0.033) (0.031) (0.011) (0.011)
Formal 0.110*** 0.133*** 0.016 − 0.004
(0.029) (0.027) (0.012) (0.011)
SME − 0.039 0.013 − 0.004 0.001
(0.039) (0.033) (0.011) (0.010)
POE − 0.000 0.018 − 0.026* 0.006
(0.053) (0.032) (0.014) (0.014)
Union 0.290*** 0.286*** 0.032*** 0.024*
(0.035) (0.038) (0.011) (0.014)
Foreign ownership 0.712** 0.305 0.218*** 0.146**
(0.273) (0.306) (0.042) (0.057)
Blue collar − 0.187*** − 0.125*** 0.018 0.006
(0.033) (0.020) (0.013) (0.010)
Constant 2.151*** 2.226*** 0.051 0.053*
(0.125) (0.113) (0.037) (0.029)
Observations 4504 4975 841 1264
R-squared 0.294 0.209 0.124 0.103
Governorate f.e. [22] Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-Digit sector f.e. [64] Yes Yes Yes Yes
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high relative to other countries. Exports more than doubled in quantity, with an 
increase of 135%, from $4.4 billion in 1998 to $10.5 in 2003–2004. Moreover, if in 
2005 Egypt’s main export were fuel products, during the trade liberalization phase 
Egypt’s economy became more diversified, with fuel exports declining to 29.3% of 
total exports in 2011 and to 14.3% in 2016 (WTO 2018). Despite these develop-
ments, for the entire period, the Egyptian trade balance was in deficit. The strong 
Table 16  Regression with year fixed effects, governorate trend and sectoral trend
Robust standard errors in parentheses. S.E. are clustered at the 1-digit sector level
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Real wage (ln) Real wage (ln) Real wage (ln) Real wage (ln) Real wage (ln)
Tarifft-1 (ln) − 0.030*** − 0.035*** − 0.018** − 0.048*** − 0.051***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007)
Age 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male 0.282*** 0.264*** 0.262*** 0.273*** 0.268***
(0.049) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.053)
Urban 0.063*** 0.015 0.027 0.023 0.025*
(0.007) (0.010) (0.014) (0.017) (0.011)
Married 0.138** 0.151** 0.151** 0.155** 0.154**
(0.040) (0.046) (0.047) (0.048) (0.050)
SME − 0.029 − 0.026 − 0.039 − 0.045 − 0.039
(0.021) (0.029) (0.030) (0.036) (0.025)
POE 0.096*** 0.090*** 0.086*** 0.102*** 0.110***
(0.020) (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.021)
Union 0.348*** 0.335*** 0.331*** 0.333*** 0.338***
(0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010)
Foreign ownership 0.752*** 0.762*** 0.769*** 0.721*** 0.729***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.004) (0.018) (0.016)
Blue collar − 0.192*** − 0.181*** − 0.187*** − 0.175*** − 0.176***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013)
Constant 1.761*** 1.949*** 1.964*** 1.921*** 2.044***
(0.066) (0.084) (0.053) (0.124) (0.149)
Observations 7163 7163 7163 7163 7163
R-squared 0.183 0.217 0.219 0.213 0.222
Year f.e. [4] Yes Yes Yes No No
Governorate f.e. [22] No Yes Yes No No
1-Digit sector f.e. [7] No No Yes No No
Sectoral trend No No No Yes No
Governorate trend No No No No Yes
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need of raw materials, semi-finished products and investment goods made the vol-
ume of imports exceed the volume of exports.
If before 2011 the Egyptian government was committed towards a reduction in 
the number of tariff bands and to tariff cuts, in the aftermath of the 2011 Revolution, 
it changed direction. To face various economic challenges, among which also a wid-
ening of the trade deficit, the Egyptian government raised import tariffs on a wide 
range of products, mainly non-agricultural goods (WTO 2018), including electronic 
devices, clothing, shoes, household appliances and plastics. In December 2016, it 
raised import tariffs for 364 tariff lines. In the Presidential Decree, the government 
Fig. 5  Indicators for Egypt’s participation to international trade. Note: “All countries” averages of indica-
tors are computed by taking a simple average of country-level point estimates. For each economy, only 
the latest available year of survey data is used in this computation. *Data only for the manufacturing sec-
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Fig. 6  Indicators for participation to international trade, by firm size. Note: For each economy, only the 
latest available year of survey data is used in this computation. *Data only for the manufacturing sector 
(Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys 2016)
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described these goods as “provocative” or “unnecessary”. For most products, the 
increase was between 100 and 200%, while for the others it varied between 50, 
125, 300, 500 and 700%.32 The lift on import tariffs aimed at cutting $49 bn trade 
deficit.33
To date, the top export destinations of Egypt are the United Arab Emirates 
($2.69B), Italy ($2.02B), Turkey ($1.98B), the United States ($1.69B) and Germany 
($1.51B). The top import origins are China ($8.07B), Russia ($5.84B), Germany 
($3.45B), the United States ($3.38B) and Italy ($3.19B). Data from 2017 show that 
Egyptian exports are mainly of crude petroleum (15.6%), gold (9.2%), nitrogenous 
fertilizers (3.8%), refined petroleum (3.0%) and insulated wire (3.0%). Imports 
instead include wheat (6.5%), petroleum gas (5.6%), semi-finished iron (3.1%) and 
crude petroleum (2.5%) (OEC 2019).34
The intensity of the foreign trade of the private sector is definitely below the aver-
age of the Middle East and North African countries and generally below the world’s 
average, as we can perceive from the extremely low percentage of firms that directly 
or indirectly export and the percentage of firms using inputs of foreign origins 
(Fig. 5). Compared to the rest of region, Egyptian firms face notable inefficiencies 
regarding customs procedures: e.g., it takes almost 13  days to clear imports from 
customs, against the nine for the whole MENA area. These figures clearly show that 
there is room to improve Egypt’s position in the rankings on ease of doing business 
or on trade facilitation aspects.
The micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME) sector appears to have par-
ticularly weak exporting capabilities when compared to the whole Egyptian eco-
nomic panorama. As it is natural to expect, and Fig. 6 shows, only 5% of small and 
9% of the medium firms directly or indirectly export, but the share increases with 
the size of the firms, with almost 38% of large firms engaged in exporting activities.
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